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Homeownership, Social Capital and Parental Voice in Schooling
* 
 
We use New Zealand school board of trustees data to examine whether schools where 
parents have high rates of homeownership experience high parental voting turnout in 
elections. We also investigate whether homeownership influences the probability that a 
school board proceeds to election, indicating parental willingness to serve as a school 
trustee. Similarly, we examine whether state-owned social housing rates affect these 
outcomes. We compile results initially without controlling for other factors, and then 
controlling for a wide range of other characteristics, to test the robustness of simple observed 
associations between homeownership and state-ownership rates and outcome variables. Our 
findings show no discernible effect of homeownership on parental voting turnout in school 
elections after controls are added (contrary to the simple positive association), but a (robust) 
positive impact of both homeownership and state-ownership rates on the probability that a 
school holds an election. 
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1.  Introduction 
The effects of homeownership on social and economic outcomes are widely discussed. 
Studies have noted benefits of homeownership on outcomes such as: wealth; labour force 
participation; urban structure; health; demographics; self-esteem; child outcomes; and social 
capital outcomes such as involvement in political and social activities (Dietz and Haurin, 
2003). 
In this paper, we focus on one specific social capital (child-related) outcome that is 
potentially affected by homeownership: parental voting turnout in local school board of 
trustees elections.
1 Reflecting common perceptions of homeownership effects, we 
hypothesise that schools in areas with higher rates of homeownership will experience a 
higher parental voting turnout in board of trustees elections (relative to a null of no effect). A 
school is a form of local amenity and the quality of amenities affects the values of properties 
surrounding them. Homeowning parents have a greater incentive than renters to vote in board 
of trustees elections, as the board is responsible for the operation and performance of the 
school. If a school underperforms, this can generate an unfavourable externality on local 
house prices which directly affects homeowners, but not renters (indeed, rents may decline). 
In addition, homeowners are less mobile than renters so there is a greater cost to them if they 
were to shift in response to school quality, again incentivising homeowners to act (more than 
renters) to raise school quality. 
Studies of the impact of homeownership on local outcomes have to account for the 
impacts of covariates that are correlated with homeownership and that themselves may 
impact on outcomes of interest. This is particularly important given that homeownership is 
commonly associated with other markers of socio-economic status such as education and 
                                                 
1 The concept of social capital was initially formulated with reference to the role of schools in the local 
community (Hanifan, 1916). 2 
 
income. We pay particular attention to controlling for other factors and demonstrate the 
importance of doing so relative to an approach that relies on simple correlations between 
homeownership and outcome variables. Our results indicate that there is a positive 
association between homeownership and parental voting turnout in school elections. 
However, once school and local characteristics are controlled for, there is no discernible 
effect of homeownership on voter turnout.  
In addition to investigating the effect of homeownership on voting rates, we analyse 
whether homeownership rates affect the probability of a school proceeding to an election. In 
2007, only around half of primary and intermediate schools proceeded to an election, whereas 
75% of secondary schools held an election. Schools proceed to an election where there are 
more candidates than available board positions; thus having an election is a marker of 
parental willingness to actively serve the school in the role of (unpaid) trustee. We find that 
high homeownership does increase the chance of a primary school proceeding to election. 
Similarly, the probability of an election increases with a higher proportion of state-owned 
houses, consistent with the theory that housing stability (through either homeownership or 
state tenancy) leads to a greater sense of community relative to other forms of tenure. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of previous 
literature; Section 3 gives a background to the New Zealand schooling system; our 
methodology is outlined in Section 4; data used in the study is described in Section 5; Section 
6 provides results of estimation; and conclusions are provided in Section 7.  
2.  Prior Literature 
Governments in many countries formulate policies and strategies to encourage higher 
homeownership rates as evidence suggests that there are positive externalities associated with 
homeownership. In the U.S., Government policy (using tax breaks and subsidies) has 
consistently been directed toward encouraging citizens to become homeowners (Haurin et al., 3 
 
2002; Green and White, 1997). In New Zealand, imputed rents for owner-occupiers remain 
tax-free (Tax Working Group, 2010). 
One fundamental difference between homeownership and renting is the transaction 
cost associated with securing and vacating a dwelling (Dietz and Haurin, 2003). Transaction 
costs are significantly greater for homeowners than for renters and, as a result, homeowners 
are likely to be less mobile, or more geographically stable, than renters. Also, the decision to 
own or to rent is a matter of choice that is heavily constrained and dependent on the type of 
dwelling a household desires to reside in (Rossi and Weber, 1996). For example, in the U.S., 
if a household wants to live in a single-family detached house, they are largely confined to 
the ownership market as few such units are available for rent.  
The benefits of owning a home can be categorised into three main types of personal 
and/or neighbourhood benefit (Boehm and Schlottmann, 1999). First, for many families, 
homeownership is the largest investment they will ever make. Therefore, the home is an asset 
which will provide future financial security for those families who can afford to purchase. 
Second, homeowners are able to gain a higher level of personal esteem and life satisfaction, 
which develops them and their children into more productive members of society. Third, 
reduced mobility of homeowners helps improve neighbourhood quality and stability. 
Reduced mobility may incentivise homeowners to be more socio-politically active than 
renters in order to improve the neighbourhood environment, which is then capitalised into 
property values.  
Koff and Sen (2005) observed the effects of homeownership on civic effort. They 
argue that sustained civic efforts lead to improvements in the local environment, which are 
then capitalised in property values. Civic efforts, however, are not contractible, so there needs 
to be some incentive for households to exert more effort. As homeowners gain from increases 
in property values, homeownership creates an incentive for homeowners to exert greater civic 4 
 
effort (which includes voting in local elections) to improve the quality of their properties and 
community in order to raise local property values. 
There are very few studies that investigate the specific relationship between school 
voting turnout and homeownership. However, studies have investigated the homeownership 
impacts on local body elections and political activity, civic effort and neighbourhood 
participation.  
Homeowners are more incentivised than renters to be politically and socially involved 
in local affairs. Homeownership influences social behaviour through two channels first, 
homeownership is an investment that alters the financial stake of households. Local affairs 
can influence house prices and, subsequently, the value of the investment. Homeowners 
therefore have an added incentive to be active in local affairs (Dietz and Haurin, 2003; 
Manturuk et al, 2010). Second, homeownership reduces the mobility of households, while 
renting households are relatively mobile. The reduced mobility incentivises homeowners to 
maintain and improve the neighbourhood’s quality-of-life, as this is directly related to their 
own quality-of-life and is also capitalised into the value of properties within that 
neighbourhood. Hence, homeowners are more likely to participate in political and community 
activities, and increase civic efforts, to ensure any negative externalities to their 
neighbourhood image are minimised (Rossi and Weber, 1996; Dipasquale and Glaeser, 1999; 
Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Koff and Sen, 2005; Manturuk et al, 2010). 
Homeowners are consistently found to vote at greater rates than renters; however the 
effect of homeownership on political interest is negligible (Rossi and Weber, 1996; Dietz and 
Haurin, 2003). Dipasquale and Glaeser (1999) find that homeowners in the United States are 
15% more likely to vote in local elections than renters and that 77% of owners had said they 
voted in local elections, compared with only 52% of renters. When repeating the analysis 
using German data, the authors found much the same behaviours, with homeownership 5 
 
increasing the probability of voting for low-income individuals by 4.3%, and high-income 
individuals by 29.1%. Recent evidence on the impact of homeownership on voting rates is, 
however, less clear-cut. While Manturuk et al (2010) find that homeownership rates have a 
significant positive effect on local political participation, Engelhardt et al (2010) find no 
evidence that such a relationship exists.  
This lack of certainty means that the impact of homeownership on electoral 
participation remains an open question. We examine this issue using a tightly defined form of 
electoral involvement: voting in one’s own child’s school board of trustees election. 
Compared with other forms of voting, the school election is closely tied to an outcome of 
direct personal interest and so provides a sharper test of homeownership versus renter 
propensity to be politically involved than prior studies where benefits of voting are more 
diffused. 
3.  New Zealand Schools Background 
3.1.  School Governance and Structure 
The governance of New Zealand schools can be broadly categorised into State, State-
Integrated and ‘Other’. State schools receive government funding (that can be supplemented 
by voluntary donations). They are generally co-educational2 and all are required to teach the 
New Zealand curriculum. State-integrated schools were previously private schools, but are 
now part of the state system. They incorporate their own special character (usually a 
philosophical or religious belief) into the New Zealand curriculum that they teach. Their 
buildings and property are privately owned, but they receive the same funding per student as 
state schools. In addition, they may charge compulsory fees to meet their property costs. 
                                                 
2 Some secondary schools offer single-sex education. Of the state secondary schools 13.5% are boys only, 
16.7% are girls only, and 69.8% are co-educational. Of the number of students attending state schools 14.4% 
attend boys only schools, 15.1% attend girls only schools and 70.5% attend co-educational schools. 6 
 
Private, or independent, schools still receive some funding from the Government, but the 
majority of their funding is received from the fees they charge. They have their own 
independent boards which govern them and must meet certain standards to be registered with 
the Ministry of Education. While they are free to teach their own curriculum, it must follow a 
learning program similar to that of the New Zealand curriculum. There is also a range of 
other types of schools that cater for the specific needs of their students (Ministry of 
Education, 2009a). Table 1 provides the number of schools and pupils by school governance 
and type. Table 1 shows that a large majority (85%) of students in New Zealand attend state 
schools. 
The structures of schools in New Zealand are determined by the age of students they 
enrol. Primary school is generally considered to encompass students in Year 1 to Year 8, 
while secondary schools encompass students in Year 9 to Year 13. The two main types of 
primary schools operating in New Zealand are contributing primary and full primary schools. 
Full primary schools enrol students from Year 1 through to Year 8, while contributing 
primary schools only enrol students from Year 1 through to Year 6. Intermediate schools 
complement contributing schools by teaching only students in Year 7 and Year 8. Generally, 
secondary schools in New Zealand enrol students from Year 9 through to Year 13, however 
other secondary school structures exist.
3 There are also a number of other less common 
school age structures that operate (Ministry of Education, 2009b).
4  
3.2.  “Tomorrow’s Schools” Reforms and Boards of Trustees 
The “Tomorrow’s Schools” reform process, implemented in 1989, comprised a number of 
structural changes in the New Zealand state education system that altered the way New 
                                                 
3 Some secondary schools also include the intermediate years (i.e. Year 7 through to Year 13). 
4 Other school structures include: Area/composite schools (Year 1 – 13); Middle schools or junior high schools 
(Years 7 – 10); senior high schools (Years 11 – 13); and another type of composite school (Years 1 – 10). 7 
 
Zealand state schools were administered (Fiske and Ladd, 2000; Ministry of Education, 
2009c). The dominant feature of the reforms was the transfer of the responsibility for running 
a school from the Department of Education to a locally elected board of trustees (BOT). The 
purpose of the BOT was to oversee the governance of a school. Its major responsibilities 
included: the management of finances; establishment and monitoring of the school’s strategic 
objectives; maintenance of physical property; and employment of staff including the 
principal. The Government also required assurance from the BOTs that students would 
receive a high quality standard of education and that resources made available to schools 
would be used efficiently and effectively (Ministry of Education, 2009d).  
Each New Zealand state and state-integrated school is required to have a BOT 
(Education Act, 1989). Elections for BOT representatives are held triennially, with the first 
election held in 1989.
5 The standard constitution of a board is three to seven parent-elected 
representatives,
6,7 the principal, one staff-elected representative, a student-elected 
representative
8, co-opted trustees, and up to four proprietors’ representatives
9. There is a 
degree of flexibility within the composition of the board; however before changes can be 
made, the current board must give the parent community reasonable notice of its intentions 
(Ministry of Education, 2009e). Parent representatives are elected by the parent community 
and/or adult students of the school. The staff representative is elected by staff members. 
Students are able to vote if the school qualifies for a student representative. Elections for 
student representatives must be held annually in September. The board itself can also co-opt 
additional trustees; however, the number of co-opted trustees cannot exceed the number of 
                                                 
5 Elections are usually held on the second Tuesday in May of the election year, unless the school is a 
correspondence school or the board, before February 1, has fixed an earlier date for the election.  
6 A parent refers to a person who is the child’s father, mother, guardian, or immediate caregiver. 
7 Originally, these seats were reserved for parent only, but, as part of the Education Amendment Act 1992, a 
provision was made that gave people without children attending a given school the right to put themselves 
forward for election. 
8 A student representative is elected only in schools with Year 9 students or above. 
9 Proprietor’s representatives are only appointed in integrated schools. They are usually elected to assure that the 
philosophical or religious belief of the integrated school is upheld in BOT decision making. 8 
 
parent trustees. In the case where a vacancy for a trustee arises, the board is able to hold a by-
election to fill the vacancy; however, a co-opted trustee can only be appointed if another co-
opted position becomes available (Education Act, 1989). A mid-term, or staggered, election 
cycle can also be adopted by the board, where half of the parent representatives are elected 
halfway into the current board’s term. These elections are held midway between triennial 
elections (18 months after triennial election). 
Another feature of the reforms was the abolition of geographical school enrolment 
zones to enable parents to choose which school their children would attend. This created 
competition between schools to attract the better students. Schools that attracted an over-
abundance of applications were required to employ their own enrolment scheme to avoid 
overcrowding within the school. In 2000, an amendment to the Education Act 1989 included 
the requirement that a school’s enrolment scheme could not act to exclude any student 
resident within the zone covered by its enrolment scheme.  
3.3.  The School Decile System 
In 1995, the Ministry of Education introduced a system of classifying schools into 
deciles based on the socio-economic background of the school’s student communities, to help 
the Ministry determine which schools required more funding (Fiske and Ladd, 2000). The 
additional funding assists schools to overcome barriers to learning that students in low socio-
economic communities may face. Decile 1 schools represent the 10% of schools that have the 
highest proportion of students from low socio-economic communities, while decile 10 
schools are the 10% of schools with the lowest proportion of students drawn from low socio-
economic communities (Ministry of Education, 2009f). Accordingly, lower decile schools 
receive larger amounts of funding.  9 
 





13, and income 
support
14 (Ministry of Education, 2009f). Information collected from the Census is used to 
calculate these factors for each meshblock
15 that a student of a particular school resides in. 
These five factors are then weighted by the number of students from each meshblock. Each 
school is ranked in relation to all other schools for each of the five factors and receives a 
score for the percentile they fall into. The unweighted total of these five scores is then used to 
produce the overall ranking of the school, in relation to all others in New Zealand. The 
schools are then allocated into one of ten deciles (Ministry of Education, 2009f). 
School deciles are automatically recalculated every five years, following a new 
census. However, schools are able to apply for a review through two criteria. The first is a 
change in the physical catchment area of the school. The second is when a school feels 
strongly that the socio-economic status of the students within the school’s catchment area has 
changed (Ministry of Education, 2009g). 
                                                 
10 Household income is the percentage of households with equivalent income (income adjusted for the number 
of adults and children in the household and the age of the children, but excludes any household that receives a 
benefit) in the lowest 20% nationally. 
11 Occupation is the percentage of employed parents working in an occupation of skill levels 4 or 5 of the 
Australia and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO). These generally comprise 
labourers, machine operators and assemblers, and other lower skilled occupations irrespective of the sector 
involved. 
12 Household crowding is the percentage of households with an equivalised crowding index greater than one. 
This index measures the proportion of household members per bedroom adjusted for the number of children 
under 10 years of age (every two are assumed to share one bedroom). Couples, and others, are each assigned 
one bedroom. 
13 Educational qualification measures the percentage of parents with no tertiary or school qualifications. 
14 Income support is the proportion of parents who directly received an income benefit (Domestic Purposes, 
Unemployment, or Sickness and Invalid’s benefit) in the previous year, but does not include parents who 
receive Family Support. 
15 A meshblock is the smallest spatial unit used by Statistics New Zealand. In urban areas it is approximately the 
size of a city block; in rural areas it is similar in population size but larger in area. 10 
 
4.  Methodology 
4.1.  Parental Voting Turnout in School BOT Elections 
We begin our analysis with a simple weighted
16 OLS regression of the parental voting rate 
regressed on the (private) homeownership rate and the state-owned housing rate,
17 with no 
additional control variables. This provides us with a ‘simplistic’ estimate of the relationship 
between private (and state) homeownership and voting participation, as may be referred to by 
commentators discussing simple bivariate associations between homeownership and other 
outcomes. We progressively introduce additional control variables to deduce whether the 
simplistic relationships (if they exist) are accounted for by other covariates, rather than 
homeownership (or state-owned housing) per se.  
The first (simple) specification is presented below: 
  i i i i SO HO out VotingTurn          (1) 
where  VotingTurnouti  represents the parental voting participation rate in school i’s  BOT 
election; HOi is the homeownership rate in the Census area unit (CAU)
18 that school i is 
located; SOi is the state-owned housing rate in the CAU that school i is located; β and γ 
represent the coefficients on HO and SO respectively; α is a constant; and εi is the error term. 
The second specification adds controls for population characteristics in order to 
ascertain whether the (simple) relationships between homeownership and election 
participation hold up after controlling for the nature of the local population. Variables 
included in this set are: an urban indicator variable (equal to 1 if school is located in an urban 
area, zero otherwise); log of CAU population per hectare (i.e. population density); log of total 
CAU population; proportion of households with school-aged students; population age-band 
                                                 
16 Weighted by school size. 
17 The state, through Housing New Zealand Corporation, owns approximately 5% of houses in New Zealand. As 
shown in Table 4, the state-owned proportion is higher than 5% for households with school-aged children. 
18 A CAU is an aggregation of meshblocks that, in urban areas, typically corresponds to a ‘suburb’. 11 
 
proportions
19; and BOT region dummies
20 (equal to 1 if school i falls in that particular board 





i p i i i POP SO HO out VotingTurn      





p represents the p
th population characteristic (listed above) for school i; and the δp 
represent the corresponding coefficients. 
School characteristics are added in the third specification as a further robustness 
check on the homeownership/voting relationship. School characteristics include: decile 
dummies (equal to 1 if a school is classed in that decile, zero otherwise), school roll numbers, 
and the number of neighbouring schools within the same CAU (a marker of school 









i p i i i SCHAR POP SO HO out VotingTurn       





s represents the s
th school characteristic of school i from those listed above; 
and the φs represent the corresponding coefficients.  
The final specification adds controls for local area characteristics. Local area (CAU) 
characteristics include: the proportion of residents new to the community within the last five 
years (from within New Zealand and overseas); the proportion of migrants; the proportion of 
residents who have participated in volunteer work within the last four weeks (as a measure of 
community social capital); the distribution of ethnicities; the proportions of structures of 
households (i.e. whether they are couple-parents, single-parent or other); proportion of 
highest qualification attained by adults; proportion of income beneficiaries; proportion 
employed and unemployed; log mean income and log standard deviation of income for 
                                                 
19 Age-bands were defined as: 17 years or younger, 18 – 24 years, 25 – 64 years, and 65 year or older. Age-band 
17 years or younger is omitted as the base group. 
20 BOT regions include: Northland, Auckland, Waikato, Bay of Plenty, Central East, Central West, Wellington 
and Wairarapa, Marlborough (including Nelson and West Coast), and Southern (combined Canterbury, Otago, 
and Southland). 12 
 
households with school-aged children; the log mean income and log standard deviation of 
income for all households in the area; and the log of the median capital value of residential 













i p i i i LACHAR SCHAR POP SO HO out VotingTurn         
 




l represents the l
th local area characteristic listed above for school i; and the λl 
represent the corresponding coefficients.  
4.2.  School BOT Election 
To investigate the impact of homeownership on the probability that a school will proceed to a 
BOT election, we adopt a similar methodology to the analysis on the parental participation 
rate in elections, but we use a weighted probit model instead of a weighted OLS regression in 
estimation. This allows us to obtain the marginal impacts of homeownership on the 
probability of a school proceeding to a BOT election.  
The resulting equations are similar to equations (1) to (4) above, with replacement of 
dependent variable VotingTurnouti with Votei (a binary variable equal to 1 if school i held a 
BOT election in 2007, or zero otherwise). The four equations are represented as:  
 (1 ) ( ) ii i i P Vote HO SO        (5) 
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ii i p i i
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 
          (8) 13 
 
5.  Data Description 
Data were obtained from two main sources: the Ministry of Education (MoE) and Statistics 
New Zealand (SNZ). The school voting and school characteristics data were sourced from 
MoE, while population and local area characteristics were sourced from SNZ. Additionally, 
we obtained the median capital values of properties in local areas from Quotable Value New 
Zealand (QVNZ). The data are explained in more detail below. 
5.1.  School Board of Trustees Election Data 
MoE took over the collection and reporting of BOT elections in 2004. It stores records on 
parents’ voting paper return rates, i.e. the number of voting papers sent out to parents in a 
BOT election, along with the number of voting papers returned. These voting paper return 
rates represent our dependent variable (parental voting turnout in school BOT elections 
(VoteTurnout)). MoE were only able to provide data on parent voting paper return rates from 
the 2007 triennial elections.
21 Many schools were missing voting results, due to those schools 
not proceeding to election. The latter data were used to construct our binary Votei variable. 
5.2.  School Characteristics Data 
MoE supplied school roll numbers from the July 2007 school roll returns. The data detail the 
total number of students enrolled in each school. School decile ratings for 2007 are also 
provided by MoE, as are data for the attainment level of secondary school leavers for each 
school. The latter data detail the proportion of students who gain university entrance (UE) or 
better, NCEA level 2 or better, NCEA level 1 or better, and little or no formal attainment. We 
create two attainment variables, high qualifications and no qualifications. High qualifications 
represents the proportion of school leavers with UE or better qualifications; no qualifications 
                                                 
21 Voting data are available for mid-term elections (held in 2005 and 2008), but because not all schools are 
required to hold mid-term elections, we did not utilise these mid-term results. 14 
 
represents the proportion of students who leave school with no formal school qualification, 
i.e. those below NCEA level 1.  
5.3.  Population and Local Area Characteristics Data 
We use 2006 individual unit record data from SNZ’s Census of Population and Dwellings to 
compile demographic and economic characteristics of households with school-aged 
children.
22 Individual unit record data is only available in the SNZ data laboratory. Given its 
high confidentiality, the individual unit record data obtained from SNZ are subject to SNZ’s 
confidentiality rules.
23  
The census variables compiled are: an urban/rural dummy, population density, 
proportion of one-family households, proportion of people new to a community, proportion 
of foreign-born residents, ethnicity proportions, household structure, highest qualifications, 
proportion of income beneficiaries, employment status, proportion participating in volunteer 
work, mean dwelling income.  
5.4.  Data Samples for Analysis 
We analyse four different samples of data, determined by the school type (full primary, 
contributing primary, intermediate, and secondary school). The age brackets of students 
enrolled differ across school types. Only parents of students enrolled at a particular school are 
able to vote in the BOT election of that school. Therefore, we restrict each school type’s data 
to measure only households with students in the appropriate age brackets. For each sample, 
we only consider state and state-integrated schools, as these are the only schools required to 
hold BOT elections.  
                                                 
22 For a few variables (e.g. population density), the variables pertain to the full CAU population. The notes to 
Tables 3 and 4 detail which choice of aggregation is relevant for each variable. 
23 These require that any data are to be randomly rounded to base 3, and small values (less than 3) are omitted. 15 
 
Each school is mapped to the SNZ Census area unit (CAU) that
 it is located within to 
capture local community effects. The BOT election voting data is available for 2007, while 
the individual unit record Census data is collected in 2006. To account for the one year 
difference, we adjust the age brackets of students back one year and select only those 
households with appropriately aged children from the 2006 census of population and 
dwellings. Table 2 presents the appropriate age brackets of children in 2006 attending each 
school type in 2007. 2006 individual unit record Census data of suitable households are then 
aggregated to CAU level and matched to schools located within that CAU. We then combine 
the Census data with the schooling data to form the sample datasets.
24  
6.  Results 
6.1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Before presenting estimation results, we provide descriptive statistics of all variables. Table 3 
presents the proportion of schools that held a BOT election in 2007, along with the 
distribution of the key variables of interest: election participation, homeownership rate, and 
the proportion of state-owned houses for households with school-aged children in the local 
area of each school. The weighted mean
25, standard deviation, and percentiles of each 
variable are reported for each sample. Observations on the participation rate in BOT elections 
and homeownership rates are evenly distributed across all samples with the mean and median 
values very similar for these two variables in each case. The distributions of the proportion of 
homes that are state-owned are skewed to the left for all samples, with the mean 
approximately equal to the 75
th percentile.  
                                                 
24 In combining the Census and schooling data, six state full primary schools and three state contributing 
primary schools were removed due to having inconsistent census data. The total number of schools used in each 
sample is provided in Table 2. 
25 Means were weighted by school size (total roll in 2007) so data represent the average pupil. 16 
 
Table 4 presents the weighted means of covariates for each of the four samples.
26 The 
variables represent weighted mean proportions of the sample populations, except where 
geometric means are used because of the nature of the data, as indicated in the table. Some 
interesting points emerge. The parental voting turnout in BOT elections is the highest for the 
full primary school sample, nearly double the rate in intermediate and secondary schools. Full 
primary schools are the most rurally located of the four samples (having the lowest 
proportion located in urban areas and population per hectare is significantly lower that other 
school types) and they have the highest proportion of state-integrated schools. 
Homeownership rates are broadly similar across school type, as is the prevalence of state-
owned houses. Proportions of ethnic groups are relatively constant across the samples, except 
that fewer Asian households locate in areas near a full primary school, i.e. Asian households 
are more concentrated in urban areas than are other ethnicities.  
6.2.  Parental Voting Turnout in School BOT Elections 
One of our two key objectives is to investigate whether a school located in an area of high 
homeownership rates (for households with school-aged children) experiences a higher rate of 
parental voting turnout in school BOT elections relative to its corresponding school sample. 
Table 5 reports the weighted OLS regression results of the relationship between 
homeownership and state-owned housing variables, and parental voting turnout. Specifically, 
we attempt to identify whether homeownership has any effect on parents’ voting habits.  
Panel A in Table 5 reports the results from the simple regression of parental voting 
turnout on the homeownership rate and state-owned housing rate with no additional control 
variables (equation (1)), to observe whether homeownership or state-owned housing rates 
                                                 
26 For secondary schools, we separately mapped the data to the local CAU and to the local school zone (only for 
those schools that had a school zone). We then obtained both CAU-based estimates and zone-based estimates 
for VotingTurnout and Vote. Results were similar, and the much larger sample size for the CAU-based estimates 
led us to favour this approach over the zone-based approach.    17 
 
have a significant association with voting rates. Panels B through to D represent results from 
estimating equations (2) – (4), where we progressively introduce additional control variables. 
These extensions enable us to infer whether the simple associations are accounted for by 
other covariates that are themselves correlated with homeownership or state-owned housing.  
From Table 5 Panel A, the homeownership rate has a positive association with the 
parental voting turnout for all schools, and is significant at the 5% level for full primary, 
contributing primary and intermediate schools. Thus, schools located in areas with higher 
rates of homeownership are observed to have higher rates of parental voting turnout in school 
BOT elections. The effect of state-owned housing is negative for all but intermediate schools, 
and is significant for full and contributing primary schools. Thus (apart from the intermediate 
school sample), schools located in areas with a higher prevalence of state-owned housing are 
observed to have a lower parental voting turnout. 
The addition of controls for population composition, density and urbanisation in Panel 
B substantially improves the explanatory power of the equations. Similar effects of 
homeownership on parental voting turnout are observed, with significant positive effects 
remaining for full primary, contributing primary and intermediate schools. The proportion of 
state-owned homes now has a positive coefficient for each sample, but none is significant. 
We include school characteristics in Panel C. The magnitudes of all homeownership rate 
coefficients are now reduced, with the secondary school coefficient now marginally negative, 
and all coefficients lose their significance. Similarly, none of the state-owned housing 
coefficients is significant.  
Panel D includes the full range of covariates. Three of the four homeownership 
coefficients are now negative and none is significant. Three of the state-owned housing rate 
coefficients are negative, with the coefficient for contributing primary schools being negative 
and significant at the 5% level. Thus, we observe that a higher prevalence of state-owned 18 
 
housing in a local area lowers the turnout of parental voting in a contributing primary school 
BOT vote. 
The results presented in Table 5 indicate that while the rate of homeownership is 
positively associated with parental voting turnout in school elections, once controls for 
population, school and local area characteristics are added, we find no impact of the 
homeownership rate on voter turnout. For the state-owned housing rate, we find a significant 
(negative) effect only for contributing schools once all covariates are added. These results 
provide a useful caution regarding use of simple associations between homeownership and 
outcome variables that may not be robust to controls for other (correlated) variables.  
The full estimation results from Panel D are provided in Table 6. For full primary and 
secondary schools, we observe that a higher proportion of dwellings with eligible children 
decreases parental voting turnout, and the size of the school roll is negatively related to 
voting turnout. These results are consistent with a hypothesis that parents are less likely to 
vote if there are more potential voters present. In these circumstances, parents may consider 
that their own vote will not influence the overall result of the outcome, and they therefore 
abstain from voting. The decile indicators imply that voting turnout is positively related to 
affluence. Schools with a larger proportion of students from more (less) socio-economically 
deprived communities receive lower (higher) rates of voting from parents of those students. 
The trend is most apparent in primary schools, although the secondary schools results suggest 
that high decile communities participate more strongly in school elections than low or middle 
decile communities. 
For secondary schools, a high proportion of households that are new to the 
community has a significant negative effect on the voting rate. Newly resided parents may 
have a less well-developed sense of the local community or know fewer candidates, resulting 
in a lower likelihood of voting in BOT elections. In primary schools, single-parent 19 
 
households are less likely to vote, while a higher proportion of Maori households reduces 
voter turnout for full primary schools. A high proportion of people who volunteer within the 
community is associated with a higher rate of voting in full primary BOT elections. This 
variable may be proxying for people with an inherently high level of social capital and 
community involvement, with these same traits carrying through to election participation.  
6.3.  Probit Analysis of the Likelihood of BOT Elections 
While the homeownership rate is found to have no effect on the parental voting 
participation rate in school BOT elections once other characteristics are controlled for, it may 
affect whether a school proceeds to a BOT election. The main reason for a school not 
proceeding to election is that it receives no more candidates than there are positions available, 
and the school therefore does not require an election.
27  
From Table 3, approximately half of each primary school type and three-quarters of 
secondary schools proceeded to a BOT election in 2007. We use probit regressions to 
investigate the possible homeownership and other influences on the probability that a school 
proceeded to a BOT election (as outlined in section 4). Table 7 presents the results from this 
analysis, highlighting the marginal effects of the homeownership rate and state-owned 
housing rate on the likelihood that a school will proceed to a BOT election.  
When there are no additional covariates (Panel A), we observe that the 
homeownership rate is associated with an increased probability of a BOT election being held 
for all school types, with significant effects for both full primary and contributing primary 
schools. The state-owned housing rate increases the probability of a BOT election for most 
schools, but only significantly for full primary schools. Adding controls for population 
                                                 
27 An alternative (but rare) reason is that a commissioner has been appointed by the Secretary for Education to 
govern the school in place of the BOT, when the BOT has failed to fulfil its responsibilities. All BOT 
responsibilities are then transferred to the commissioner. (Education Act, 1989). 20 
 
composition, density and urbanisation (Panel B), we observe similar results to the previous 
model: a significant positive effect from homeownership on the probability of holding a BOT 
election in full primary and contributing primary schools, and no significant effect of the 
state-owned housing rate on the probability of a BOT election. Panel C adds controls for 
school characteristics. The effect of homeownership is now no longer significant for any 
school type (with the exception of a weakly significant result for contributing primary 
schools). State-owned housing rates significantly increase the probability of a BOT election 
within intermediate schools (with a weak effect also for full primary schools).  
Panel D adds controls for local area characteristics. This full model, with all 
covariates included, indicates that homeownership significantly increases the chance that a 
full primary or contributing primary school will hold a BOT election. Similarly, a high 
prevalence of state-owned housing significantly increases the chance of a BOT election for 
full primary and intermediate schools (with a weak effect also for secondary schools).
28  
Thus, we observe that the probability of a BOT election being held in (full and 
contributing) primary schools is significantly and positively affected by homeownership 
rates, but the same effect is not observed for schools catering just to older age groups 
(intermediate and secondary schools). The estimated coefficients imply that full 
(contributing) primary schools with a 10 percentage point higher local area homeownership 
rate are 5.5 (7.9) percentage points more likely to hold a BOT election. Given that only 
around 50% of primary schools hold a BOT election these are fairly large effect sizes.
29  
                                                 
28 We are wary, however, about the estimated size of the marginal effects relating to the intermediate school 
sample since that sample is small (N=121) and we have 40 explanatory variables in the equation.  
29 These results suggest that, if anything, our prior estimates for the impact of homeownership on BOT election 
turnout (Table 5) could be biased upwards as we may expect homeownership to have a larger impact on BOT 
election turnout in schools where high homeownership has increased the likelihood of having elections in the 
first place. These findings therefore reinforce our prior conclusion that homeownership, per se, has no impact on 
voter turnout in a BOT election.  21 
 
One explanation for these results may be that homeownership increases people’s 
sense of community, since it has been shown to increase their enthusiasm towards being 
involved in local community affairs (Roskruge et al, 2011). A higher rate of homeownership 
may therefore lead to more parents standing for the board, increasing the probability of a 
school holding an election. The spatial catchment of primary schools is generally more 
focused on a local community than are those for intermediate and secondary schools. 
Homeowners may be less enthusiastic in standing for these larger schools that service 
multiple communities, as they do not feel as great an affinity or affiliation with those outside 
their immediate local community.  
The significant (positive) coefficient on the state-owned housing rate accords with the 
finding in Roskruge et al (2011) that state tenants have a statistically similar sense of 
community to homeowners, with each having a significantly greater sense of community than 
private renters. The estimated coefficients imply that full primary schools with a 1 percentage 
point higher local area state-owned housing rate are 1 percentage point more likely to hold a 
BOT election. The mean school only has 6 percent of the local housing being state-owned so 
effect sizes are similar to those for homeownership. These results suggest that the security of 
the long-term tenancies available to state tenants (relative to private tenants) has positive 
social capital spin-offs for the local community.  
The full set of results of the probit regression with all covariates included is presented 
in Table 8. The size of a school has a significant and positive effect on the probability of a 
school holding an election; this applies to all school types analysed. Larger schools will have 
a greater pool of parents from which potential candidates for the board may arise and, 
therefore, less chance that the school will have a lack of candidates to force an election. A 
consistent finding with the VoteTurnout results is that a school is more (less) likely to hold an 
election if it is high (low) decile. High (low) socio-economic parents may have more (less) 22 
 
self-esteem, or available time, than other parents and therefore be more willing to put 
themselves forward as a candidate.  
7.  Conclusions 
Many countries have implemented policies to boost homeownership rates with the aim of 
improving household and community outcomes. Prior evidence indicates that homeowners 
are more politically active than renters and have higher voting rates in political elections. 
Homeowners are also less mobile and have invested a large financial stake in their own 
property, and are therefore more incentivised to improve the quality of their neighbourhood. 
We have analysed one aspect of political participation and civic effort, investigating 
the effect of homeownership rates on parental voting turnout and parental participation in 
school board of trustees elections. All state and state-integrated schools in New Zealand are 
required to hold a board of trustees election triennially, and parents are able to stand for, and 
elect, parental representatives to the board. Parental voting is not compulsory, and schools 
receive widely varying rates of parental voting.  
We utilise data on the 2007 school board of trustees elections to estimate the effect of 
homeownership on parental voting turnout in schools. Four samples of data were analysed, 
one for each of the school types: full primary, contributing primary, intermediate, and 
secondary school. Simple weighted OLS regressions, where only the homeownership rate and 
the rate of state-owned housing were controlled for, found a positive association between 
homeownership and parental voting turnout in all school types. There was a negative 
association between the state-owned housing rate and the parental voting turnout. The effects 
on voter turnout of homeownership and of state-owned housing rates fall away once 
additional controls are included for population, school and local area characteristics. The 
implications of these estimates are that homeownership has no discernible effect on the 
parental voting turnout once other factors, such as school size and decile ratings are 23 
 
controlled for. State-ownership rates are found to have a negative impact on voting turnout 
only for contributing primary schools once other factors are controlled for. 
Homeownership, however, consistently affects the chance that a primary school 
proceeds to a school BOT election. Based on prior literature, we conjecture that 
homeownership increases owners’ sense of community and, therefore, increases their 
willingness to stand as a candidate for the board. However, this behaviour does not carry 
through to intermediate and secondary schools, which generally service larger communities. 
As the community size increases, the affinity and enthusiasm for homeowners to stand for a 
board decreases, hence decreasing the probability that these schools proceed to a BOT 
election. As the state-housing rate increases, the probability of proceeding to an election 
again rises (for three of the four school types).  
The results for the probability of holding an election are consistent with the theory 
that housing stability (either through owner-occupation or through a state tenancy) leads to a 
greater sense of community and civic involvement for those in such forms of tenure. 
However, this effect seems limited to direct personal participation in school affairs. We find 
no broader benefits of homeownership or of state-ownership in enhancing parents’ 
involvement in participatory democracy in the form of ‘school voice’.  24 
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Table 1: 2007 School Numbers and Rolls by Governance and School Type 
 
  Full Primary  Contributing Primary  Intermediate  Secondary  Other  TOTAL 
State 
Schools  888 744  121  194  203  2,150 
Pupils  136,901 199,495  57,087  194,834 56,149  644,466 
State-Integrated 
Schools  184 49  0  28  65  326 
Pupils  29,458 9,339  0  11,507  34,158  84,462 
Other 
Schools  29 0  2  12  64  107 
Pupils  5,380 0  192  4,403  20,802  30,777 
TOTAL 
Schools  1,101 793  123  234  332  2,583 
Pupils  171,739 208,834  57,279  210,744 111,109  759,705 
Proportion in the Analysis Sample*  Schools  0.97 1.00  0.98  0.95  NA  0.85 
Pupils  0.97 1.00  1.00  0.98  NA  0.84 
Note: Sourced from the Ministry of Education. The box inside the bold lines constitutes the analysis sample for the remainder of the paper.
* The analysis samples in our study only consider state and state-integrated schools across the school types shown. The proportions do not sum perfectly for full primary 
and contributing primary schools, due to the loss of six state full primary schools and three contributing primary schools in the formation of our analysis samples.  
 Table 2: Data Samples used in Analysis 




Number of Schools  1,066  790  121  222 
Years of Students  Year 1 – Year 8  Year 1 – Year 6  Year 7 – Year 8  Year 9 – Year 13 
Age of children in 
households (2006) 
4 – 11 years  4 – 9 years  10 – 11 years  12 – 16 years 
Aggregation Level  Census Area Unit Census Area Unit Census Area Unit  Census Area Unit
 
 Table 3: The Distribution of Election Participation and Homeownership across Students
  Full Primary  Contributing 
Primary  Intermediate Secondary 
Proportion of Schools with a Board of Trustee Election 
Proportion 0.48  0.55  0.50  0.75 
Participation Rate in Board of Trustee Elections for each School with an Election 
Mean 0.38  0.31  0.22  0.22 
Std. Dev.  0.16 0.12  0.13  0.14 
10th Percentile  0.20  0.17  0.13  0.12 
25th Percentile  0.27  0.23  0.15  0.15 
50th Percentile  0.36  0.30  0.18  0.19 
75th Percentile  0.48  0.37  0.23  0.26 
90th Percentile  0.60  0.46  0.28  0.30 
Homeownership Rate in the Local Area of each School 
Mean 0.60  0.58  0.56  0.60 
Std. Dev.  0.16 0.16  0.15  0.14 
10th Percentile  0.38  0.36  0.34  0.41 
25th Percentile  0.50  0.47  0.47  0.52 
50th Percentile  0.63  0.59  0.58  0.62 
75th Percentile  0.72  0.70  0.67  0.69 
90th Percentile  0.80  0.77  0.75  0.76 
State-ownership Rate in the Local Area of each School 
Mean 0.06  0.07  0.09  0.07 
Std. Dev.  0.10 0.11  0.11  0.10 
10th Percentile  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
25th Percentile  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
50th Percentile  0.02  0.03  0.05  0.04 
75th Percentile  0.08  0.09  0.11  0.09 
90th Percentile  0.17  0.22  0.26  0.19 
Number of Schools  1,066  790  121  222 
Note: All results except the first panel are weighted by school size so that the data represent the distribution across 
pupils. Homeownership and state-owned housing rates are calculated for households with school-aged 
children in the area unit in which the school is located. 
  
 
Table 4: Mean Characteristics of Students across Schools 
  Full Primary  Contributing 
Primary  Intermediate Secondary 
BoT Election Participation Rate  0.38 0.31 0.22  0.22
State-Integrated School 0.18 0.04 0.00  0.06
School Had a Mid-Term Election  0.06 0.07 0.03  0.02
Mean School Roll (geometric)  228 327 521  1,099
School Leavers with No Qualifications  0.18
School Leavers with High Qualifications     0.26
In an Urban Area 0.78 0.95 1.00  0.99
Mean Population (geometric) 2,623 3,245 3,376 3,191
Mean Pop per Hectare (geometric) 3.19 11.83 19.49 14.05
Population Age <18  0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30
Population Age 18-24  0.09 0.10 0.12 0.12
Population Age 25-64  0.59 0.58 0.57 0.57
Population Age 65+  0.02 0.02 0.01  0.01
Dwellings with Eligible Children 0.23 0.18 0.08  0.17
Homeownership Rate  0.60 0.58 0.56  0.60
State-Owned Housing Rate 0.06 0.07 0.09  0.07
New to Community in Last 5 Years  0.60 0.65 0.59  0.56
Foreign-born 0.20 0.25 0.29  0.29
Volunteered in Last Four Weeks  0.19 0.17 0.16  0.14
Pakeha Ethnicity 0.52 0.47 0.41  0.47
Maori Ethnicity 0.21 0.19 0.20  0.18
Pacific Island Ethnicity 0.07 0.10 0.11  0.09
Asian Ethnicity 0.06 0.11 0.14  0.14
Other Ethnicity 0.14 0.13 0.13  0.13
Couple with Children Household 0.69 0.68 0.64  0.62
Single Parent Households 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.28
Other Households  0.08 0.09 0.09  0.09
No Qualifications 0.22 0.19 0.22  0.24
School Qualifications 0.33 0.33 0.34  0.37
Post-school Qualifications 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.18
University Qualifications  0.13 0.16 0.14 0.12 
Employment Rate  0.70 0.68 0.67 0.65 
Unemployment Rate  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 
Receiving Social Benefits  0.14 0.14 0.14 0.11 
Mean Dwelling Income (geometric) 45,694  45,783 44,330 46,089 
Std Dev Log Dwelling Income  0.68 0.70 0.72 0.74 
Mean Dwelling Income in Area (geometric)  40,770 40,891 38,662 39,034 
Std Dev Log Dwelling Inc in  Area  0.73 0.75 0.77 0.77 
Median House Value in Area    255,304 309,976 307,804 306,630 
Sample  Size  1,066  790 121 222 
Note: All results are weighted by school size so that the data represent the average pupil. All variables are calculated 
for the area unit in which the school is located. All characteristics except school characteristics, population 
(including components), area incomes and house values are defined over the sample of adults with eligible school-
aged children. 
 
 Table 5: Weighted OLS Regression of BoT Participation Rates versus Homeownership 
  Full Primary  Contributing 
Primary  Intermediate Secondary 
Panel A: No Additional Control Variables 
Homeownership Rate  0.141* 0.215** 0.392*  0.072 
(0.061) (0.056) (0.164) (0.104) 
State-owned Housing Rate  -0.311* -0.182*  0.120  -0.131 
(0.111) (0.081) (0.127) (0.149) 
R-Squared  0.142 0.164 0.148 0.040 
Panel B: Adding Controls for Population Composition, Density and Urbanisation to Panel A 
Homeownership Rate  0.155* 0.200** 0.273+  0.065 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.150) (0.140) 
State-owned  Housing  Rate  0.126 0.037 0.061 0.006 
(0.095) (0.075) (0.165) (0.164) 
R-Squared  0.545 0.395 0.382 0.184 
Panel C: Adding Controls for School Characteristics to Panel B 
Homeownership Rate  0.057 0.052 0.250 -0.077 
(0.052) (0.060) (0.203) (0.176) 
State-owned  Housing  Rate  0.031 -0.022 0.306 0.013 
(0.104) (0.076) (0.279) (0.154) 
R-Squared  0.660 0.520 0.526 0.299 
Panel D: Adding Controls for Local Area Characteristics to Panel C 
Homeownership Rate  -0.003 -0.016 0.061 -0.643 
(0.067) (0.097) (0.540) (0.401) 
State-owned Housing Rate  -0.042  -0.175*  1.091  -0.298 
(0.103) (0.087) (0.665) (0.234) 
R-Squared  0.694 0.559 0.825 0.401 
Number of Schools  512  437  61  167 
Notes: ** indicates significance at 1% level of significance. * indicates significance at the 5% level of significance. +
indicates significance at the 10% level of significance. Numbers contained within parentheses represent standard 
errors. School characteristics added in Panel C include: decile dummy variables (decile 5 omitted as base) and the 
log of school roll. Local area characteristics added in Panel D include: one-family households, new to community 
within last five years, foreign-born, ethnicity categories (Pakeha omitted as base), household structure categories 
(couple households omitted as base), highest qualification categories (no qualifications omitted as base), income 
beneficiaries, employment statuses, volunteer work within the last four weeks, and log of mean dwelling income.  
 Table 6: Weighted OLS Regression of BoT Participation Rates – Full Results  
  Full Primary  Contributing 
Primary  Intermediate Secondary 
Coef S.E. Coef S.E.  Coef S.E. Coef S.E. 
Homeownership Rate  -0.003  (0.067) -0.016 (0.097) 0.061 (0.540) -0.643 (0.401)
State-owned Housing Rate -0.042  (0.103) -0.175* (0.087) 1.091 (0.665) -0.298 (0.234)
Urban/Rural -0.028  (0.020) -0.040 (0.027) 0.105 (0.072)
Log Population  -0.008  (0.008) 0.025* (0.013) -0.069 (0.122) -0.033 (0.029)
Log Population per Hectare  0.002  (0.005) -0.009 (0.005) -0.010 (0.080) -0.003 (0.024)
Pop Age 18-24 (vs < 18)  -0.306  (0.213) -0.056 (0.149) 0.371 (1.99) -1.57*  (0.689)
Pop Age 25-64 (vs < 18)  0.020  (0.169) -0.028 (0.213) 1.375 (2.09) -1.65*  (0.497)
Pop 65+ (vs < 18)  -1.83  (1.522) 1.094 (1.46) 28.06 (20.7) -9.61*  (3.414)
Has Eligible Children  -0.188+ (0.102) 0.157 (0.202) -1.653 (3.514) -1.84* (0.698)
State-Integrated School 0.096**  (0.018) 0.034 (0.025) -0.020 (0.052)
Had Mid-Term Election  -0.003  (0.016) -0.006 (0.016) 0.028 (0.046)
Log School Roll  -0.117**  (0.010) -0.104** (0.013) 0.044 (0.105) -0.107* (0.043)
Boarding Facilities    -0.043  (0.027)
# Neighbouring Schools  -0.002  (0.002) -0.003** (0.001) -0.027 (0.024) 0.001 (0.006)
Leavers w/ No Quals  -0.015  (0.128)
Leavers w/ High Quals     0.085  (0.120)
Decile 1 School (vs 5)  -0.072*  (0.026) -0.105** (0.025) -0.180 (0.257) -0.076 (0.130)
Decile 2 School (vs 5)  -0.027  (0.024) -0.064* (0.020) -0.133 (0.228) -0.026 (0.070)
Decile 3 School (vs 5)) 0.000  (0.024) -0.049* (0.024) -0.042 (0.159) -0.009 (0.052)
Decile 4 School (vs 5)  -0.011  (0.021) -0.033* (0.017) -0.111 (0.137) 0.060 (0.054)
Decile 6 School (vs 5)  0.034  (0.021) 0.012 (0.020) -0.066 (0.170) 0.078 (0.051)
Decile 7 School (vs 5)  0.042*  (0.019) 0.051+ (0.026) 0.040 (0.211) 0.076 (0.056)
Decile 8 School (vs 5)  0.044*  (0.022) 0.037+ (0.019) 0.225 (0.182) 0.130* (0.065)
Decile 9 School (vs 5)  0.057*  (0.021) 0.042* (0.020) -0.177 (0.239) 0.220* (0.092)
Decile 10 School (vs 5)  0.080**  (0.023) 0.064* (0.023) -0.007 (0.221) 0.187* (0.090)
New to Community   0.013  (0.088) 0.038 (0.101) -0.831 (0.560) -0.512+ (0.287)
Foreign-born -0.109  (0.177) -0.096 (0.125) -1.083 (0.777) -0.649 (0.437)
Volunteered in Last 4 Weeks  0.440*  (0.154) 0.066 (0.156) -3.011 (2.226) 0.287 (0.627)
Maori (vs Pakeha)  -0.154+ (0.085) 0.000 (0.075) -0.519 (0.695) -0.226 (0.320)
Pacific Island (vs Pakeha) 0.032  (0.132) 0.031 (0.094) -0.411 (0.756) 0.238 (0.425)
Asian (vs Pakeha)  -0.082  (0.122) -0.152 (0.098) 0.370 (0.692) 0.492 (0.357)
Other (vs Pakeha)  -0.075 (0.178) 0.125 (0.215) -1.658 (1.066) -0.103 (0.647)
Single-parent (vs Couples) -0.369*  (0.129) -0.359* (0.156) -0.073 (0.746) -0.274 (0.279)
Other-parent (vs Couples) 0.065 (0.178) -0.061 (0.165) -0.510 (1.539) 0.076 (0.619)
School Quals (vs No Quals)  -0.054  (0.180) -0.152 (0.169) 0.990 (1.075) 0.693 (0.626)
Post-school (vs No Quals) -0.441*  (0.171) -0.426* (0.203) 1.072 (1.414) 0.015 (0.788)
University (vs No Quals)  -0.048  (0.185) -0.005 (0.155) 1.572 (1.196) 0.217 (0.684)
Missing Quals (vs No Quals)  -0.034  (0.250) -0.467+ (0.274) 2.987 (1.944) 0.145 (0.909)
Receiving Social Benefits  0.077  (0.231) 0.086 (0.206) -0.833 (1.298) -0.783 (0.650)
Employed -0.024  (0.199) 0.013 (0.150) -1.053 (1.390) -0.852 (0.677)
Unemployed 0.204  (0.396) -0.024 (0.330) 0.170 (2.105) 0.329 (1.576)
Mean Log Dwelling Income  -0.136  (0.099) -0.029 (0.137) 0.646 (0.578) -0.096 (0.243)
S.D. Log Dwelling Income -0.040  (0.081) -0.001 (0.083) 0.125 (0.402) -0.228 (0.225)
Mean Log Dwell Inc (Pop) 0.067 (0.077) -0.162 (0.109) -0.259 (0.360) 0.062 (0.196)
S.D. Log Dwell Inc (Pop) 0.189+ (0.113) 0.097 (0.126) 0.827 (0.776) -0.259 (0.353)
Log Median House Value  0.006  (0.015) 0.032 (0.021) 0.002 (0.174) -0.040 (0.058)
R-Squared 0.694 0.559 0.825 0.401
Sample Size  512 437 61 167
Notes: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and 
all estimates are weighted by school size and hence represent the relationships for the average pupil. Board regions 
were control for, but are not presented. 
 Table 7: Marginal Effects of Homeownership on the Probability of BOT Election 
  Full Primary  Contributing 
Primary  Intermediate Secondary 
Panel A: No Additional Control Variables 
Homeownership Rate  0.521* 0.447*  0.299  0.133 
(0.170) (0.180) (0.508) (0.284) 
State-owned Housing Rate  0.488*  -0.020  0.630  0.071 
(0.289) (0.261) (0.647) (0.372) 
Panel B: Adding Controls for Population Composition, Density and Urbanisation to Panel A 
Homeownership Rate  0.497* 0.752**  0.408  0.438 
(0.193) (0.208) (0.569) (0.308) 
State-owned  Housing  Rate  0.479 0.110 0.875 0.472 
(0.332) (0.308) (0.764) (0.416) 
Panel C: Adding Controls for School Characteristics to Panel B 
Homeownership Rate  0.162  0.439+ 0.163  0.350 
(0.217) (0.233) (0.698) (0.279) 
State-owned Housing Rate  0.681+ 0.549 1.959* 0.430 
(0.360) (0.343) (0.893) (0.340) 
Panel D: Adding Controls for Local Area Characteristics to Panel C 
Homeownership Rate  0.546* 0.791* -0.234 -0.031 
(0.262) (0.340) (1.449) (0.296) 
State-owned Housing Rate  0.992*  0.277  3.159*  0.494+ 
(0.354) (0.426) (1.566) (0.288) 
Number of Schools  1,066  790  121  222 
Notes: ** indicates significance at 1% level of significance. * indicates significance at the 5% level of significance. +
indicates significance at the 10% level of significance. Numbers contained within parentheses represent robust 
standard errors. School characteristics added in Panel C include: decile dummy variables (decile 5 omitted as base) 
and the log of school roll. Local area characteristics added in Panel D include: one-family households, new to 
community within last five years, foreign-born, ethnicity categories (Pakeha omitted as base), household structure 
categories (couple households omitted as base), highest qualification categories (no qualifications omitted as base), 




Table 8: Marginal Effects on the Probability of BOT Election – Full Results 
  Full Primary  Contributing 
Primary  Intermediate Secondary 
Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. 
Homeownership Rate  0.546*  (0.262) 0.791* (0.340) -0.234 (1.449) -0.031 (0.296)
State-owned Housing Rate 0.992*  (0.354) 0.277 (0.426) 3.159* (1.566) 0.494+ (0.288)
Urban/Rural -0.077  (0.074) -0.139 (0.115) -0.037 (0.109)
Log Population  -0.036  (0.031) -0.032 (0.046) 0.002 (0.213) 0.065+ (0.035)
Log Population per Hectare  -0.025  (0.019) 0.005 (0.025) 0.350 (0.233) -0.041* (0.017)
Pop Age 18-24 (vs < 18)  -0.200  (0.793) 1.610* (0.739) 1.875 (3.622) 0.943+ (0.558)
Pop Age 25-64 (vs < 18)  0.475  (0.712) 1.188 (0.877) 3.620 (4.865) 1.368* (0.604)
Pop 65+ (vs < 18)  -6.372  (5.579) 3.429 (7.123) 74.40* (34.72) 3.274 (3.639)
Has Eligible Children  0.438  (0.514) 0.661 (0.969) 6.945 (7.736) 0.690 (0.610)
State-Integrated School  -0.016  (0.064) -0.125 (0.087) 0.042 (0.049)
Had Mid-Term Election  -0.019  (0.090) -0.133 (0.087) -0.029 (0.095)
Log School Roll  0.236**  (0.036) 0.277** (0.048) 0.433+ (0.255) 0.171** (0.043)
Boarding Facilities    0.039  (0.035)
Neighbouring Schools  0.006  (0.008) -0.009 (0.006) 0.107* (0.044) 0.009+ (0.005)
Leavers w/ No Quals  -0.050  (0.149)
Leavers w/ High Quals     -0.104  (0.168)
Decile 1 School (vs 5)  -0.096  (0.117) -0.194 (0.121) -2.076* (0.634) -0.006 (0.091)
Decile 2 School (vs 5)  -0.282*  (0.105) -0.182+ (0.100) -1.113* (0.490) 0.013 (0.055)
Decile 3 School (vs 5)) -0.194+ (0.106) -0.067 (0.090) 0.516+ (0.303) 0.013 (0.058)
Decile 4 School (vs 5)  -0.189*  (0.092) -0.124 (0.093) -0.108 (0.277) -0.058 (0.046)
Decile 6 School (vs 5)  0.058  (0.094) 0.021 (0.098) 0.479 (0.303) 0.078 (0.051)
Decile 7 School (vs 5)  -0.074  (0.098) 0.066 (0.091) 1.242* (0.438) 0.019 (0.051)
Decile 8 School (vs 5)  -0.058  (0.099) 0.048 (0.106) 1.882** (0.476) 0.004 (0.052)
Decile 9 School (vs 5)  -0.048  (0.098) -0.007 (0.104) 1.455* (0.482) -0.070 (0.059)
Decile 10 School (vs 5)  0.107  (0.106) 0.134 (0.116) 2.843** (0.698) 0.184* (0.079)
New to Community   0.218  (0.363) 0.091 (0.393) 0.969 (1.274) -0.204 (0.270)
Foreign-born -0.278  (0.745) -0.157 (0.629) -6.241* (2.222) 0.488 (0.427)
Volunteered in Last 4 Weeks  0.362  (0.549) -0.327 (0.698) -0.014 (2.949) 0.590 (0.598)
Maori (vs Pakeha)  -0.553+ (0.312) -0.034 (0.369) -0.035 (1.323) -0.503+ (0.268)
Pacific Island (vs Pakeha) -0.958+ (0.528) 0.102 (0.503) 5.303* (1.918) -0.584+ (0.311)
Asian (vs Pakeha)  0.313  (0.662) 0.160 (0.480) 9.685** (2.937) -0.333 (0.377)
Other (vs Pakeha) 0.010  (0.649) 1.205+ (0.636) 7.442* (2.900) -0.779 (0.549)
Single-parent (vs Couples) 0.887+ (0.528) -1.271* (0.628) -4.679* (1.492) 0.680+ (0.386)
Other-parent (vs Couples) 1.042  (0.732) -0.525 (0.848) 5.367* (2.428) 0.989 (0.661)
School Quals (vs No Quals)  0.328  (0.723) -0.615 (0.733) -2.951 (2.550) -0.667 (0.566)
Post-school (vs No Quals) -1.082  (0.738) -1.019 (0.802) -10.53* (3.315) 0.543 (0.649)
University (vs No Quals)  -0.514  (0.679) -0.400 (0.662) -6.049* (2.825) 0.307 (0.477)
Missing Quals (vs No Quals)  -0.500  (1.036) 0.143 (1.044) -8.299* (3.404) 0.093 (0.842)
Receiving Social Benefits  -0.475  (0.780) 1.833* (0.912) 2.877 (2.992) 0.262 (0.748)
Employed -0.277  (0.700) 0.543 (0.736) 9.874** (2.315) 0.305 (0.550)
Unemployed -0.012  (1.514) -0.594 (1.487) 11.66* (4.995) -0.972 (1.192)
Mean Log Dwelling Income  -0.538  (0.395) -0.103 (0.454) -0.054 (1.176) 0.589* (0.270)
S.D. Log Dwelling Income -0.553+ (0.310) 0.600+ (0.331) 0.423 (0.822) 0.245 (0.242)
Mean Log Dwell Inc (Pop) 0.132 (0.330) -0.313 (0.366) -1.594 (1.391) -0.522* (0.230)
S.D. Log Dwell Inc (Pop) 0.440 (0.573) -0.245 (0.656) -3.163 (2.757) -0.593 (0.411)
Log Median House Value  0.085  (0.060) 0.113 (0.079) -0.029 (0.358) -0.123* (0.053)
Sample Size  1,066 790 121 222
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
and all estimates are weighted by school size and hence represent the relationships for the average pupil. Board 
regions were control for, but are not presented. 
 
 